- “in june of 2014, a force of fewer than a thousand lightly armedjihadi militants shocked the world by racing across the iraqi desert, attacking a seeminglyfar superior garrison of iraqi soldiers, and seizing control of the second largest cityin iraq. in the time since, the creation of this first world city of terror has been widelydismissed as inexplicable. but as the jihadis have used the city’s enormous wealth topump violence and poisonous ideology around iraq and the world, the true shape of thestory has slowly come into focus. the terrible and mundane historical forces that led tomosul’s fall are the same that have been directing its fortunes since the very beginning.in all likelihood, they’re the forces that
will dictate its future as well.†- "the city of mosul has existed for thousandsof years. straddling the tigris at a crucial midpoint between the persian gulf and mediterraneansea, it has fertile lands and a highly defensible countryside. but it’s the city’s poweras a trading center that most shapes its early destiny. the ancient babylonian and assyrianempires keep a tight hold over the area from the beginnings of history, and in 650 bc theassyrians choose a modern-day suburb of mosul to host the empire's capital. the lucrativeriver gate is subject to a thousand years of invasions by turkish, persian, and evenmongol armies, but the 600s ce sees the rise of the prophet muhammad, and widespread islamicconquest. after muhammad’s death, a schism
over inheritance of power produces two mainsects of his new religion: sunni, and shia islam. from the beginning, the sunni religiondominates the muslim population, and throughout history, the persian empires of iran remainthe sole major shia power in the world.†- “mosul lies near the interface betweenthe sunni ottoman empires, and the shia persian empires, setting the stage for hundreds ofyears of strife. during the 11th and 12th centuries, mosul serves a major staging areafor the muslim side of the crusades. combined with a brutal cull of assyrian christiansin the 1400s, this shifts the area toward being predominantly arab, and muslim, withnotable populations of stateless peoples like the kurds and jews. eventually, the ottomanturkish sultan suleiman the magnificent turns
back the iranian empire, creating a new caliphatethat encompasses all the major cities of sunni islam, including jerusalem, damascus, mecca,medina, cairo, and baghdad.†- “around the same time, an ultra-conservativerevivalist movement springs up in arabia under a rural imam named muhammed al-wahab. hiswahabi doctrine preaches perfect adherence to the teachings and even the medieval lifestyleof the prophet, in particular the incitements to conquest and violent conversion of infidelsincluding less observant sunni muslims. the ottomans battle these more extremist forcesfor hundreds of years throughout arabia, remaining mostly dominant, and keeping their extremismfrom entering mesopotamia. the ottoman’s version of the sunni religion comes to definemost of the ethnicities of what will become
northern iraq, while persia’s shia islamremains dominant further to the south. eventually, mosul becomes the center of its own ottomanprovince, giving it several hundred years of safety and prosperity, and allowing itto maintain a diverse population of arabs, assyrians, kurds, turkmen, and many smallminorities. several hundred years later, this ends, with the outbreak of the first worldwar.†- “the ottomans manage to hold mosul throughoutthe fighting, but by the end of the war, french and british troops have advanced all the wayto mesopotamia. the defeated ottomans sign an armistice to end the middle eastern theatreof the war, splitting the once great sunni empire according to european interests. accordingto these new sykes-picot borders, mosul should
go to a new french-controlled area that willgo on to become turkey — immediately after signing the agreement, however, the britishsimply march troops into mosul anyway. with the ottomans still recovering from a crushingdefeat, no opposition is possible. mosul, a sunni majority city, now falls within theborders of a new shia-majority state called iraq, not sunni majority turkey. expandingiraq’s borders north also ensures that a geographically unified nation of kurds willnow be split between four new countries, with competing ambitions. over the ensuing twentyyears, however, this british gamble pays off, as mosul’s enormous oil reservoirs becomea source of increasing wealth, and power. to the south, most of the arabian peninsulais given over to the ottomans’ old fundamentalist
rivals, wahhabi sunnis following a line oftheocratic kings: the house of saud. like iraq, this new saudi kingdom will turn outto have some of the largest oil reserves in the world, and the immense wealth allows themto bring the historically isolated and medieval wahabi ideology to unprecedented global prominence.†- “in iraq, colonial rule lasts until 1932,when political resistance forces the united kingdom to leave. to avoid losing all influenceover the country, the british fall back on their old tactic of supporting local powerssympathetic to british interests, and install their wartime allies, the arab sunni royalfamily, the hashemites. this solidifies the british choice to side with iraq’s sunniminority over the shia majority. in 1941,
the hashemites are overthrown in a nationalistcoup, leading the english to fear they could lose access to crucial iraqi oil reservesright in the middle of the second world war. breaking forces away from the european front,britain re-occupies iraq, and deposes the new government of rashid ali. once order isrestored, britain again entrusts iraq to the hashemites, who are again overthrown in 1958.†- "throughout the next decade the arab socialist baath partyrises to prominence, and with it an ambitious young shepherd’s son with a talent for violencenamed saddam hussein. by the time the baath party seizes power in 1968, mosul is baskingin the never-ending upswing of middle eastern oil. it founds the university of mosul, whichbecomes a cultural center and great source
of pride — but by the 1970s, the dual arab-kurdishcity is less diverse than during most of its history. it thrives under saddam’s sectariansunni government, providing a huge proportion of his upper level government and militarypersonnel, but the large kurdish population means that the city also remains a sourceof political and insurgent efforts by kurdish separatists. the tigris river delineates theethnic divide, with sunni arabs on the west of the river, kurds, shia arabs, and smallminorities on the east. it’s a rich, fractured place, and a desirable prize for turkey, iran,and a long-awaited iraqi kurdistan.†- "saddam is able to broker iraq's oil reservesinto extreme wealth and military dominance, but no matter how brutal his tactics become,he cannot permanently put an end to unrest
among the kurdish and shia arab populations.iran arms and funds the iraqi kurds, helping them stage repeated uprisings in the faceof unspeakable oppression. the situation shifts suddenly in 1979, when the iranian revolutionbrings the rise of the ayatollah khomeini, who immediately tries to foster a populistshia coup against saddam’s sunni baath party. partly to end iran's aggressive influence,and partly to take advantage of a weakened rival on the world stage, saddam attacks in1980.†- “the resulting iran-iraq war lasts eightyears, killing millions with brutal, world war i-era tactics and heavy use of chemicalweapons. in particular, saddam uses chemical weapons against northern kurdish rebels whofight with iran. eventually, he tries to cow
the kurdish and shia arab populations withinhis own borders by turning his weapons of mass destruction on civilians, sparking internationaloutrage but limited intervention. mosul, with its large kurdish population, is on the frontlines both figuratively and literally, but its wealth is such that during this time itcompletes construction of the saddam dam — now the mosul dam, the fourth largest in the middleeast. when the iran-iraq war ends in 1988, both iraqi and iranian borders are unchanged;mosul is standing but burned, tarnished by growing ethnic and sectarian hatreds. saddamknows mosul is one of the keys to the kurdish resistance, and throughout the north his forcesmurder at least a hundred thousand kurdish civilians.â€
- "in iraq, simultaneously putting down largekurdish and shia resistance groups and fending off much of the middle east requires sucha large and expensive military that even iraq’s enormous oil economy is eventually pushedto the breaking point; in 1990, saddam masses much of his force along the border with kuwait,the tiny southern micro-state that is home to almost as much oil as iraq itself. saddaminvades, and america intervenes by brokering the construction of military bases in saudiarabia. these crusader outposts in the holy land fuel islamist anger in the years to come.from these bases, the us initiates the gulf war, dominating saddam’s forces and pushingthem all the way back to baghdad. the us destroys more than two thirds of his military capacity,but saddam takes his toll as well. when the
bush administration stops short of topplingthe government, saddam manages to consolidate power and avoid being overthrown. frustrated,and lacking the political support to do it with american power, bush calls on the iraqipeople to rise up and depose saddam.†- “in the north, the kurds do rise up — butthough it does set up a no-fly zone to stop devastating air attacks on kurdish civilians,the us provides no real assistance to the rebel cause, a grudge many kurds hold to thisday. saddam’s crackdown kills a large fraction of the kurds in iraq, but continued uprisingsand american air cover eventually force him to accept a de-facto autonomous kurdish regionin the north. when the iraqi army eventually withdraws from kurdish territory, however,mosul’s large garrison of loyalist soldiers
hold their ground. the city is now one ofthe only major kurdish populations not within the new semi-autonomous region of iraqi kurdistan,which envelops the city on three sides.†- “saddam funds some politically-mindedislamic extremists from places like iran and saudi arabia, and allows them to use the iraqidesert to train for later insurgencies against these international rivals. at the same time,a new ideology emphasizing aggressive, global jihad emerges largely from the conservativewahabi sunnis of saudi arabia. many of these largely fundamentalist sunnis go to afghanistanto join the holy war against the soviet occupation, and fight under the command of a wealthy andcharismatic young saudi, named osama bin laden. with western assistance, the afghani resistanceeventually forces the soviet union to withdraw,
giving bin laden his first true glimpse ofa way to successfully wage unfettered jihad in a world ruled by global super-powers. thisis how al qaeda is born, helping to break a modern global power against an ancient andtraditional nation. his new jihadis are natural enemies of saddam’s oppressive, largelysecular government; their adherence to the wahabi doctrine means they view saddam’scorrupt sunni dictatorship as no less blasphemous than a shia, christian, or even jewish state.in any case, throughout the 1990’s, iraq’s most dangerous terrorists are all in saddam’smilitary, and cabinet. these figures design and implement iraq’s ‘arabization’ program,driving many of the smaller minorities like yazidis and christians out of mosul and intothe countryside, causing the city to be defined
even more strongly by its arab-kurd splitin demographics.†- “until the early 2000s, american and coalitionaircraft continually patrol iraqi airspace, and frequently bomb anti-air emplacements;though more than a decade passes between the two gulf wars, the american military nevertruly leaves iraq. bin laden makes repeated attempts to goad america into the sort oflarge-scale military action that had been so grievously harmful to the soviets — andeventually, this effort proves successful. as tensions rise after 9/11 and the americaninvasion of afghanistan, saddam lets some afghan resistance fighters train inside iraq.but within the us government, the effort is specifically to connect saddam to al qaeda,and through them the 9/11 attacks. zarqawi’s
presence in iraq becomes one of the pillarsof the us argument for invasion, despite the known fact that this relatively low levelmember of al qaeda had only travelled to iraq upon hearing of a looming us invasion. withinternational pressure building, mosul’s university and the al kindi military basemake it a source of scrutiny for the un-mandated weapons inspectors. as he does at all suchinspection sites, saddam hides his lack of weapons of mass destruction by giving inspectorsonly partial access, or refusing them entirely. this gives the second bush administrationthe final point it needs to convince america of the case for invasion — and this time,the us war machine invades iraq for real.†- “the second gulf war offers no more lastingimpediment to the american military than the
first. in less than three weeks of directfighting, american forces completely topple saddam’s control over all areas of the country.baghdad and the shia south come under attack mostly from bases in kuwait, while in thenorth, turkish political resistance forces the us to deploy from iraqi kurdish territory.the cia and us special forces work with the kurds and their peshmerga fighters, leadingmany arabs to view the us as a friend to the kurds above all other iraqis. us-led forceseventually move into mosul, and northern iraq is quickly given over to the command of generaldavid petraeus and his 101st airborne division." - "petraeus is an expert in counter-insurgencyand nation building thanks to tours in countries like bosnia and haiti. he invests significanttime and resources in reopening vital infrastructure,
including the university of mosul, and repairsbattered villages surrounding the city. petraeus tries to work through local hostility, rehabilitating the the economywhile carrying out hundreds of targeted raids on known insurgents. more controversially,he employs former iraqi military commanders and baathist police officers to put an endto violence in the streets. the strategy is at least somewhat successful, leading manyto praise petraeus for getting results. but no general, alone, can offset the catastrophiceffects of decisions being made in baghdad." - “in may 2003, the us officially sets upthe coalition provisional authority to govern the country during the transition to a newdemocratic government, and appoints as its leader a former aide to henry kissinger namedl. paul bremer iii. bremer has no combat or
wartime experience, but he is a longtime believerin power politics. accordingly, coalition provisional authority order number 1 is entitled'the de-baathification of iraqi society.' named and modeled after the de-nazificationof germany after the second world war, this involves the systematic purging of anyonewith ties to saddam's baath party. it extends from the halls of government down to the universities,and even hospitals, and hits establishment sunni cities hardest. together with unrestrainedlooting of the ministries in baghdad, this results in the crippling of the iraqi government.following the invasion, mosul is without basic services for some time." - “but the enormity of cpa order number1 is only a prelude to cpa order number 2:
the dissolution of the iraqi army. in a singleday, the cpa makes unemployed a quarter of a million men with fighting experience, noviable economic future, and a history of combat with americans. it is widely cited as oneof the biggest contributors to the development of a robust resistance within iraq, swellingthe ranks of the previously isolated hardcore of remaining baath party loyalists; shortlyafter bremer disbands the army, attacks from iraqi insurgents begin in earnest. unemploymentskyrockets further than ever, especially in sunni areas where military recruiting hadbeen heaviest. mosul, one the hearts of saddam's military complex, is hit hardest of all. anyattempt to rebuild an effective iraqi military to combat insurgents will now have to startlargely from scratch."
- in july of 2003, saddam’s notorious sonsuday and qusay hussein are found and killed in combat near mosul, where they have beenhiding among relatives and other baath party loyalists. this deals a harsh blow to thebaathist insurgency — but has no effect on sectarian religious groups, or kurdishfighters who view the chaos of invasion as a chance to carve out a truly independentkurdish state. hatreds are kept mostly in check, however, until just before the newyear, when us forces find saddam hiding in a bunker near tikrit. the war against saddamis officially over, but iraq seems no more governable than before." - "in 2004, petraeus and the 101st are replacedin northern iraq by a single brigade with
no command experience in counter-insurgency.their stryker combat vehicles are intimidating and aloof as they roam the hostile city, engagingin sporadic firefights throughout the day and night before rolling directly back toa secluded forward operating base. in general, these us forces have virtually no peacefulinteraction with local sunnis, and begin to back their existing kurdish allies almostexclusively. this creates further resentment in the sunni majority city, even as the cpastruggles to get baghdad and shia iraq back in working order. with the rule of law breakingdown across the country, the coalition is desperate for willing and experienced policecommanders. washington backs a number of controversial appointees, including an ex-republican guardcommander named mehdi gharawi. gharawi was
one of the only shia soldiers who managedto work his way to a position of power within saddam’s feared, sunni-first military unit,and when he is given command of a division of the national police, he goes about enforcingthe will of the state in the only way he knows; during this time his forces are responsiblefor beatings, kidnappings, torture, and murder. he is also accused of using his unit as afront for brutal shia militias in the area." - mosul, along with the southern city of fallujah,is a center for the insurgent forces, but fallujah is seen as the bigger threat afterhigh profile killings of private military contractors in november of 2004. the us deploystroops to fallujah from mosul — which then immediately comes under attack itself. leftwith mostly iraqi army and police forces to
defend the city, "up to 3,200 of the city's4,000 police officers either desert or join the insurgents during the attacks.†dealingwith uprisings in two cities, it takes the us and iraqi forces days of fighting to reclaimcontrol over most of mosul, and the northern section remains a source of insurgency forseveral months, including a devastating suicide bombing of a coalition mess tent. during these months,mosul’s infrastructure again collapses, and until order is restored it is left withoutpolice or government, lapsing into widespread humanitarian crisis. the incident becomesknown as the battle of mosul, and it is the blueprint for even more important battlesstill to come." - "the military sophistication and incredibleviolence displayed by the extremists in their
brief foray into mosul becomes a hallmarkof al qaeda in iraq, and in particular its leader, abu musab al-zarqawi. now armed withyears of experience, zarqawi has made common cause between his jihadis and the baathistsfighting under saddam’s old second in command. with the help of baathist generals leadingexperienced soldiers from the disbanded iraqi army, this new branch of al qaeda becomesresilient to us counter-insurgency measures. however strong, zarqawi’s aqi breaks withthe global al qaeda leadership by carrying out frequent acts of sectarian terrorism againstshia muslims in addition to their anti-western attacks. bin laden wants zarqawi to attackcoalition forces, however, and turn iraq into a quagmire until western troops withdraw.but zarqawi’s bloodlust will not be restrained,
and as the early years of the occupation wearon, once-peaceful cities are rocked by hundreds, and eventually thousands of car bombs in civilianneighborhoods. the proto-isis practice of releasing gory execution videos takes rootat this point, terrifying and radicalizing population. zarqawi’s insurgency particularlytargets shia holy sites, including the great mosque in samarra, one of the holiest placesin all of shia islam. this attack comes to define the most effective extremist recruitingstrategy, setting off weeks of shia reprisals that kill thousands of sunnis, and drive thousandsmore into the hands of al qaeda.†- "in spite of widespread threats from jihadisand anti-coalition insurgents, iraq hosts two contentious elections in 2005, each withextremely high participation. though the sunni
minority still feels it has been excludedfrom real input, eventually power shifts to a shaky political coalition headed by a little-knownshia dissident named nouri al-maliki. though the main goal of de-baathification is to endsectarian discrimination in the government, maliki has been a sectarian all his life.he spent the majority of his adult years in exile, hiding in the shia states of iran andsyria, and working to have saddam overthrown. after the us deposed saddam’s sunni-ledgovernment, maliki returned to baghdad to be a part of bremer’s new shia-first alternative.as one of the few shia choices palatable to the americans and other international forces,maliki comes to lead a shia political coalition, and forms iraq’s first true democratic government."
- “the same month, the public learns ofa secret government prison in baghdad run by gharawi, and sees evidence of the mentaland physical abuse of over a thousand prisoners, most of them sunnis. despite frequent callsfrom president bush himself, maliki continues to privilege loyal sectarians, while excludingthe country’s sunni minority from most positions of power. due to his time in tehran, and hisanti-sunni behavior, maliki comes to be seen as a pawn of iran, which is also funding southernshia militias throughout this period. the shia nation wants to use iraq as a bufferof casualties to prevent what it sees as a looming us invasion of iran itself. but itsserial meddling in baghdad, coupled with the sectarian violence of their allied militias,ends up playing into al qaeda’s hands by
creating resentment among northern sunnis.this throws a wrench into both countries’ plans for the country.†- “then, a great victory — zarqawi iskilled in us airstrike, likely targeted thanks to a tip from within al qaeda itself. butas zarqawi’s chosen lieutenants now move up the chain of command and come to run aqi,they prove just as disloyal to bin laden’s strategic commands, and just as thirsty forthe blood of non-sunnis. aqi goes through several successive changes in identity, andleadership, but as the disciples of zarqawi begin to remake the iraqi jihad in their ownimage, al qaeda in iraq starts to truly become what we now know as isis. one of the mostprominent post-zarqawi commanders goes by
the name abu bakr al-baghdadi, and over thenext several years he comes to control the ever-shifting community of iraqi extremists.true to zarqawi’s legacy, the nascent islamic state believes in undermining government andcoalition rule primarily by sowing chaos and discord in the country as a whole. the ultimategoal of baghdadi and those like him is to establish the final islamic emirate, but theproximate goal is to start a nation-wide religious civil war.†- “by 2007, mosul is ruled at the levelof the neighborhood. kurdish peshmerga protect most of the eastern neighbourhoods, whilesunni insurgents including al qaeda both protect and exploit many in the west. government andcoalition control is patchy — but david
petraeus, working all the way back in washington,has one final contribution to make to mosul’s future: the us troop surge. the campaign generallybegins in the the south of iraq, so as the 20,000-man influx of us troops pushes theinsurgency north, mosul becomes one of many sites of intensifying violence. what had beena major center for rebel activity becomes the center, and the us begins to try its newstrategy of living among the iraqis to lessen the chaos in the streets, just as insurgentviolence against us and iraqi forces reaches an all-time high." - "during the height of the surge, losinghundreds of americans every month, petraeus makes a controversial move: he uses us militaryfunds to pay certain of the sunni insurgent
groups to become local police forces alliedagainst al qaeda, which has alienated even fellow sunni islamists with its wanton violence.the move is controversial to say the least, sparking a minor uprising among petraeus’upper ranks. after several attempts at english language branding, including concerned localcitizens and very worried iraqis, the groups are eventually named the sons of iraq. thoughthe move is widely criticized on ethical and strategic grounds, after months of escalatingcombat with surge troops, the situation turns. al qaeda’s core strategy of attacking thendisappearing into a population no longer works in many cases, and with few places left tohide most extremists are eventually killed, captured, or forced to retreat into pakistanand afghanistan. over the next several years,
violence decreases slowly but steadily acrossiraq." - “immediately after election, the obamaadministration sharply changes this american approach. the new president is deeply skepticalabout the ability of military power to ever fix a situation like iraq, and he becomesstuck between the responsibility bush foisted on america to keep iraq from devolving intototal chaos, and his belief that america could easily become endlessly stuck in the quagmireof middle eastern politics. obama is frustrated with seemingly endless calls to await a moreeffective iraqi military to take over for us patrols, and wants to end the war as hehad promised he would while campaigning. despite warnings from top military commanders thattroops had years of work still to do to create
a sustainable peace, obama announces a timelinefor us troop withdrawal. he believes that america must extricate itself from iraq, and thatthe process will only become more painful as time passes.the hope is that without americanpower to prop up a dysfunctional system, iraq will be forced to become less sectarian inthe government and military, or fail utterly — but to troops on the ground, the newlyrebuilt iraqi army seems almost comically unprepared for the task before them. withsuch a large and dedicated insurgent community, mosul particularly exemplifies this problem.to maliki, this is the main implications of the us timeline: he is now now sure to loseaccess to american power before the country
is truly secured. fearing the islamists andother challengers, maliki greatly steps up his use of force. there are violent clasheswith kurdish and sunni protestors, and maliki begins more aggressively purging non-loyalistsfrom all levels of the government and military." - "in baghdad, a court finally charges gharawi for his commandof the illegal government prison, but the shia commander is too useful to malaki tosimply throw away. after several years of stalling, and over the strong objections ofthe us ambassador to iraq, the government officially refuses to arrest him. a year later,as the last us troops prepare the leave, maliki appoints gharawi to command the national policeforce in mosul. a shia sectarian butcher is
now in charge of protecting and pacifyingthe largest sunni majority city in the country, the last truly intractable source of the insurgency,and the biggest kurdish population not under kurdish control." - "when the last us troops leave in decemberof 2011, maliki signals the true return of tactics familiar to iraqis, by issuing anarrest warrant for his sunni vice president and rival, tariq al-hashimi. the iraqi military'seffectiveness is continually degraded by sectarian promotions and culls, and gharawi's increasinglybrittle mosul defense force is faced with policing an increasingly hostile population.large numbers of sunnis begin turning up dead in the streets, dumped as examples to anyonethinking of supporting al qaeda."
- "and just then, at the height of the uncertaintyfor mosul’s future, the syrian civil war boils over along iraq’s north-western border.the global leadership of al qaeda, including baghdadi in iraq, decides to dispatch a forceto exploit the chaos. they call it the nusra front, and while us forces have battered alqaeda into a temporary defeat in iraq, this new syrian affiliate finds enormous successin the dispossessed sunnis of eastern syria. much like the oppressed shia majority of saddam’siraq, syria’s sunni majority has long been excluded and oppressed by the sectarian governmentof bashar al-assad. they take the ancient sunni city of raqqa, home to almost a quarterof a million people, and quickly come to hold widespread, if deserted, territory well acrossthe iraqi border. in part because of their
success, the syrian extremists begin to fractureat this point. isis believes it is entitled to an ancient area encompassing iraq, syria,israel, palestine, and lebanon, and baghdadi’s troops fight intermittently with those loyalto the global al qaeda leadership and nationalist syrian jihadis, both of whom take offenseat baghdadi’s audacity in declaring the nusra front under isis control.†- "during this time, isis scores a numberof crucial wins. as assad comes down harder on largely secular rebel forces, those rebelsincreasingly seek help from the united states, or anyone else who can give a fighting chanceto their totally outmatched force of former civilians. when america proves unwilling tointervene, with chemical weapons falling regularly
on civilian neighbourhoods, they turn to theonly group both willing and able to help. the hardcore of experience and weaponry inthe nusra front. perversely, this actually helps assad’s image around the world, andin one incredibly successful move, the syrian dictator deliberately strengthens this extremistelement within the opposition to his government, by releasing large numbers of jihadis fromsyria’s prisons — these seasoned fighters quickly join the local anti-government chapter,strengthening assad’s claim that he is primarily fighting a coup by radical islamists. thisnarrative invalidating the syrian opposition is so successful, that when assad drops deadlysarin gas on a civilian neighborhood in the ghouta countryside, the world hesitates asit actually considers the possibility that
the rebels gassed themselves for the internationalsympathy. the us, along with the rest of the western world, is paralyzed by conflictingpriorities, while assad and the jihadis do everything they can to accelerate syria’swild spiral into anarchy. nusra’s appeal to the moderate rebels comes from their combatexperience, organization, and above all their ability to make money. the syrian resistance,meanwhile, provides the extremists a seemingly endless supply of recruits in return. assad’shorrific crimes spur tens of thousands of idealistic young muslims around the worldto go to syria to fight for their oppressed sunni brothers, but when they arrive, theyfind the resistance dominated by extremists. many are quickly radicalized, and end up fightingfor isis all over the middle east.â€
- “in iraq, the new recruits allow isisto stage a daring attack on abu ghraib prison, mere kilometers from baghdad itself, releasingover 500 inmates, most of them veterans of the insurgency. among those released is abdulrachmanbilawi, a saddam loyalist who will go on to become the isis military chief for all ofiraq. many of the others prisoners have harrowing tales of abuse at the hands of american soldiersand interrogators — much of the physical abuse is tame relative to what iraq has seenin the past, but stories and images of religious and personal shaming drive many young muslimsinto the ranks of the islamic state. by the end of this rapid expansion, combined nusra-isisterritory comes dangerously close to mosul, but the extremists are still too weak to considerattacking directly.â€
- "the isis advance is so alarming that malikiheads to washington to personally request more direct american military assistance.short of some extra missiles and vehicles, however, the obama administration refusesto reengage american power. when he returns to iraq, maliki yet again increases his useof force, arresting parliamentary rivals and provoking violent clashes with police. oneparticular clash in hawija becomes a massacre, killing hundreds and finally destroying anyhope of a united iraq until maliki. the result of this attempt to pacify the sunni communityis a widespread sunni uprising, and just as maliki's brutal and inept national forcesstruggle with a raging population, the syrian-armed isis force attacks.â€
- “by the end of their months-long offensive,it's june of 2014, and the black flag of al qaeda now flies over a wide swathe of themiddle east. with major bases in raqqa in syria, and fallujah in iraq, isis starts tobecome a household name around the world. the fall of fallujah is particularly bitingto the americans who fought so intensely for the city just a few years before. isis territorynow stretches dangerously close to mosul's outskirts and its lucrative oil fields." - "in the middle of this isis advance andthe larger sunni awakening, gharawi’s shia national police force only clamps down harder.gharawi’s force in mosul has opened fire on peaceful protesters, and his troops havebeen credibly accused of murdering five locals
in cold blood, including a 15-year-old boy.gharawi believes the extremists view mosul as their emirate, their home turf. he fullyexpects an attack, and brutality with the sunnis he sees as the allies of al qaeda ishis only method of prevention. rather than reprimand his lieutenant for fostering furtherchaos in the sunni city, maliki rewards gharawi by making him operational commander for mosul’sentire province of ninawa." - "over the first half of 2014, kurdish intelligencecomes to the iraqi government with a tip: jihadis are massing near the syrian border,and there are rumors of a coming large-scale attack on mosul. gharawi replicates this warningwith his own intelligence, gathered from several isis sleeper agents captured in the city itself.they've been slowly cutting the city off from
crucial supplies, including the destructionof several bridges, and intelligence suggests their move into the city’s underworld oforganized crime is bringing them millions per month. the syrian civil war has armedthem with significant amounts of captured military hardware — willingness to comewithin striking distance of mosul is made obvious by several attempted jailbreaks atnearby prisons. gharawi’s requests for a larger city defense force fall on deaf ears;in baghdad, the assumption is that the jihadis could never take mosul, and if they did, theycould be driven out quickly, just like last time. - "immediately before they attack, isis seesthe situation in much the same way. the plan
is to set out for mosul in a lightning fastconvoy of pickup trucks, with suicide bombings softening the city for a quick, strategicattack. the goal is to take portions of the city long enough to liberate jihadis fromthe local prisons. what they can’t know is how profoundly gharawi's security forcehas been diminished by cuts, corruption, and incompetence, and that their own fearsomereputation has taken a strong hold among the iraqi security forces.†- “many soldiers pay a third or half oftheir salary to their commander in exchange for staying home, allegedly accounting foras many as half of the budgeted defenders. there should be several thousand defendersfrom the iraqi army's third division alone,
and close to 25,000 including police. by somereports, in reality this combined force numbers fewer than 10,000. and while mosul is a storagesite for a huge cache of american weapons left over after withdrawal, most of the defendersare poorly armed and outfitted. this is the force tasked with protecting a city of almosttwo million people, most of whom view them as violent, foreign-backed oppressors." - "on june 4, gharawi's forces find and cornerbilawi just outside mosul. he blows himself up to avoid capture, but searches of his hometurn up documents that reveal the entire upper structure of isis. the hope is that the lossof such a figure and his intelligence will delay any plans for attack, but isis artillerybegins shelling some northern areas the next
day. their efforts at prevention have failed,and on june 6, 2014, the attack begins. suicide trucks hit the city's outer defenses, followedquickly by several hundred fighters in humvees and pickups. they have small arms, rpgs, andlarge caliber mounted machine guns, making them better armed than the iraqi militaryunits they are facing. as they carry out their plan to take and hold a few important easternneighbourhoods, they begin to execute captured police and army personnel -- by hanging, orburning, or crucifixion. some display the bodies on the hoods of their trucks, whichare greeted warmly by many sunni residents in these eastern areas. planned by bilawiand coordinated by his fellow ex-baathist commanders from saddam’s army, the offensiveis more successful than the extremists could
have dreamed, and as the iraqi forces beginto fall back, excited isis commanders realize they could take far more than the local prison.they call for reinforcements from the syrian arm of the extremist force, pulling from apool of nusra fighters that did not exist two years before. as the sun sets on june6, the city's fate is far from assured." - "the next day, seeing the potential fora complete isis takeover of mosul, the kurds come to maliki to offer assistance. he refuses,twice, presumably fearing it could one-day be difficult to get rid of peshmerga forcesthat have dug into the city militarily. without these crucial reinforcements, gharawi's forcesare forced to fall back throughout the second day of the battle. the rate of their advanceskyrockets on june 8, however, with the arrival
of the syrian reinforcements -- more than100 additional vehicles carrying at least 400 fighters. at the same time, isis activatessleeper cells throughout the city. these local sunni and baathist loyalist groups attacksecurity forces from among their assigned populations, just as a renewed isis forceattacks the front with astonishing ferocity. in the face of this assault, and with no connectionto their increasingly hostile charges, gharawi's force collapses. their commanders are largelyincompetent patronage appointees who misuse the resources they do have, and huge numbersof troops turn and run without firing a shot." - "the extremists take badoush prison, freeinghundreds more inmates to help secure the city. the people are rising up for isis, many ofthem from petraeus' sons of iraq. previously
at war with al qaeda, the rebel groups havecome to view the sectarian oppression of maliki's shia forces as the greater threat. the citypetraeus once held up as the model for managing the rest of iraq has now become the world'smost important center for terror.†- “on june 9th, the extremists end the battle.an enormous, truck-borne bomb finishes a dramatic last stand by iraqi security forces at abandonedhotel -- the city's highest commanders are soon seen retreating across the tigris andeventually leaving the city, and gharawi himself makes a desperate escape under heavy fire.after this, every remaining member of the security forces either joins the jihadis ordiscards his uniform, burns his camp, and runs
for the hills." - "mosul is the biggest power center everacquired by a terrorist group, and isis treats it accordingly. over the next few days, fighterspour into the city and secure it beyond any hope of recapture by the iraqi army alone.more than a quarter of the city, at least 500,000 people, are forced to flee — andthe kurds in particular make heroic efforts to take in the displaced families. even lessthese citizens, mosul is by far the largest extremist victory the world has ever seen— in 2014, its population is significantly larger than all other isis-controlled citiescombined.â€
- “in taking mosul, the already surgingisis force captures billions of dollars of cash, oil, and oil reserves to finance theirwars, and the second-largest cache of us-made weapons and equipment in the country. theirloot includes tens of thousands of small arms, thousands of humvees and armored vehicles,significant numbers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, artillery including more than 50howitzers, and even m1a1 tanks. elated, the extremists push on, and armed with the mostadvanced weaponry in the region outside of israel, they continue their rampage throughnorthern and even into southern iraq. the iraqi army garrison in nearby kirkuk abandonsthe city before isis even arrives, but with the city now ripe for the taking, the kurdsseize the opportunity to annex a city they
see as rightfully theirs. peshmerga forcesmove into the city, securing it from both the extremists and the iraqi government thatostensibly rules it. the kurds look out over the desert at mosul, and dream of one-daytaking the last missing piece in their quickly forming state within iraq." - "taking mosul puts the islamic state inthe center of the public eye, and in the weeks that follow, baghdadi uses the city as thestage for his next great move. he holds an unprecedented sermon in broad daylight atthe city's great mosque, announcing the formation of the final islamic state, and pronouncinghimself its caliph. from this well known pulpit, with his face in full view, baghdadi declareswar on the world. the powerful implication is that
he is speaking from within the secured bordersof a true islamic state. he calls on all muslims everywhere to join the cause -- and the dramaof the moment launches this call to enormous prominence. tens of thousands answer, allowingthe group to push its agenda in iraq and continue to destabilize syria. and, now secure in wellfortified cities, isis can dispatch some of its most effective commanders to lead sizablebut disorganized insurgent communities in places like libya, egypt, and yemen. likezarqawi before them, these is commanders understand the power of chaos, and the outsized rolethey can play in any area with long-simmering local tensions. they also uphold zarqawi’slegacy by continuing to refuse the larger al qaeda strategy of seeking alliances withlocal populations."
- “the people of mosul witness this inherentfalseness to the islamic state’s ideology more clearly than anyone. to clear badoushprison, isis fighters release sunnis inmates, both jihadis and other criminals, but hundredsof other shia and minority inmates are slaughtered to clear their cells. many jihadis operateas simple thugs, while others oppress fellow sunnis for following a different or less stringentversion of the religion, or simply because they can. islamic state spiritual authoritiesrecognize the necessity of appeasing their largely rabid base of fighters, and regularlyproduce new religious interpretations with the specific aim of legitimizing theft, murder,and particularly rape of whole populations of people. incompetence and the skewed prioritiesof total war lead to a breakdown in basic
services, while many jihadi soldiers focussolely on wanton destruction." - "within a month of baghdadi's speech, theislamic state dynamites several major cultural and religious sites around the city, includingancient historical grounds and the tomb of the biblical jonah. when it announces a planto destroy one of the city's most iconic structures, the great leaning minaret at the same mosquethat had just hosted baghdadi's famous sermon, dozens of citizens form a human wall to protectit. over the next several months, islamic state fighters destroy hundreds of pricelessartifacts, and steal many others to sell on the black market. they also kill or driveout thousands of minorities, particularly yezidis and christians, remaking the populationof their new iraqi capital in their own image.â€
- “their wahabi sect of sunni islam wasregressive even when it was founded several hundred years before — now, in 2014, isisbegins to try to enforce the laws and social structures of seventh century arabia on adiverse, modern city. from multiple mandatory daily prayers to edicts completely banningall forms of music, the attempt does not go smoothly. public executions are daily occurrences— one day, they throw an accused homosexual from the roof of a tall building, the nextthey burn several yezidi women alive for refusing to have sex with isis fighters. even sunniarab women experience incredible oppression, and have virtually no freedom in this newcaliphate. sex slaves from minorities deemed unworthy of human rights become an acceptedpart of the compensation provided to any isis
fighter who desires one. badoush prison becomesa living nightmare for hundreds of yezidi women, who are kept and serially assualteduntil they convert to the wahabi religion. those who do are sold off as wives to isisfighters. in all, isis manages to turn the people of mosul against them even more quicklythan maliki. a small but extremely dedicated multi-ethnic resistance force emerges withina matter of months, calling itself the mosul battalions." - "facing such opposition, priority numberone for the extremists is to find a way to sell their newfound riches in oil, and soonenough countries like turkey, russia, and even assad’s syrian government are accusedof purchasing this cheap, bloody oil on the
black market, even while opposing the groupon other fronts. all that’s ever proved, however, is that someone is buying isis energyproducts. in august, the riches and weaponry captured in mosul allow the islamic stateto take its apocalyptic agenda to all-new places, namely into kurdish territory in bothiraq and syria. it takes the enormous mosul dam, disrupting repairs on a structure insuch poor condition that the us army corp of engineers once described it as the mostdangerous dam in the world. if it breaks, estimates say over a million people coulddie from mosul down to baghdad, with millions more displaced. the extremists also take valuableoil fields, and begin to approach erbil, a city of more than 1.5 million kurds. theydemolish huge swathes of the iraqi-syrian
border in an attempt to undo the europeansykes-picot agreement that fractured of the muslim world after the first world war." - "it's the threat to erbil that prompts theobama administration to act to protect the city's sizable american population and enormouslevel of american investment. the us begins openly arming the kurds, and carries out airstrikeson islamic state targets, with a particular effort to destroy captured american armor.the spread into kurdistan slows, but the momentum of the jihadis is far from broken." - "during this time, the islamic state alsotakes the small yezidi town of sinjar, and perpetrates a massacre of thousands. morethan 40,000 of the survivors are driven into
the sinjar mountains, trapped without foodor water. the plan is to starve them to death, but iraqi and coalition aid keeps them alivewhile air-strikes slowly weaken the extremist force waiting below. it is the attempted yezidi genocide as much as anythingelse that spurs larger international intervention. shortly after the incident, canada, the uk,france, australia, germany, turkey, italy, poland, and denmark all sign on to lend militarysupport." - "maliki is fiercely protecting his holdon power throughout this period -- he blames gharawi for mosul’s loss, and tries to bringhim up on charges for abandoning his post
during the attack. before the trial can goforward, however, the us says that further military support will come only if malikisteps aside. he finally does. maliki’s replacement, a relative moderate named abadi, must now goabout the slow, painful process of undoing the corruption and sectarian discriminationin the government and military, and it has to do it while fending off the surging islamicstate. empowered by the public outrage at a litany of grisly isis execution videos,and eventually terrorist attacks in the west, obama and his coalition make this quest easierby opening up the bombing war. training personnel embed with the iraqi army, but coalition troopsavoid direct combat. as 2014 draws to a close,
the allied nations begin to carry out thestyle of sustained, distant killing not seen in iraq since the first gulf war.†- “over the course of 2015, the islamicstate’s sprawling territorial gains begin to fall apart. combat with iraqi forces andsustained coalition airstrikes bring their fighting force from almost 35,000 to under20,000, while strategic operations against banks, oil supplies, and cash transfers crippletheir ability to pay and equip their forces. al qaeda has at times disavowed and declaredwar on isis for its slaughter of fellow muslims, and the syrian nationalists in the nusra frontcontinues to resist baghdadi’s attempts to assert islamic state control over the extremistsin both countries.the shia ayatolla sistani,
the most powerful religious leader in iraq,declares a fatwa against the islamic state in the weeks after mosul’s fall, greatlyinvigorating war-weary southern iraqis. the brutality of both sides in the syrian civilwar provides the nusra front ample fuel for its hatred-based ideology, but in iraq evenmost conservative sunnis have given up trying to live alongside the jihadis. their terrifyinglightning war strategy has backfired — now, the fearsome reputation of the islamic statedrives the world to join forces and stamp them from existence.†- “the international crackdown also hasself-interested motivations, as helping to fight the islamic state has given forces loyalto iran, turkey, kurdistan, and other nearby
powers an excuse to surround the city. iran,long the only major shia power in the world, spends enormous amounts of money and influenceto direct the political tides in the newly shia-run iraqi government. iran is desperateto form a multi-national shia front against their sunni arch-rivals in saudi arabia. theshia militias that support the iraqi army are staffed mostly by idealistic young believersfollowing the ayatollah sistani’s call, but a hefty portion of undercover iranianagents taint these militias in the eyes of northern sunnis. to allow coordination withthe mosul battalions inside mosul itself, and avoid a possible iranian or kurdish annexation,the us wants iraq to raise a strong force of iraqi sunni fighters to take back the city.but every day they hold back and wait for
that force to materialize is a day mosul remainsunder the yoke of the islamic state.†- “with isis thus largely contained, endlesscombat and airstrikes from coalition forces have forced the jihadis to increasingly abandonthe core conceit of the islamic state: a safe, independent nation for terrorists. now, thegroup is by necessity reverting to many of the global guerilla tactics of al qaeda. despitetheir attempt to turn back to the people for cover, isis’ total lack of al qaeda’sability to form alliances has left its fighters in mosul beset on all sides, just like gharawibefore them. their response to this pressure has been predictable: a wave of bombings inbaghdad, multiple times daily murders of shia civilians, designed to drum up sectarian hatredfor iraq’s sunnis, and perpetuate the violence
and chaos that feeds its apocalyptic ideology.†- “as mosul slowly fell to the islamic state,widespread reports indicate that on multiple occasions the iraqi army opened fire on thecity’s sunni civilian population. in the heat of battle, with a grisly death approachingfrom within their own charges, the soldiers had branded them all al qaeda. the resultwas a backlash that echoed decades of violence in iraq, and hastened the fall of a majorcity to fewer than a thousand lightly armed marauders. this is the core strategic insightof isis, adapted from bin laden’s epiphany in creating the al qaeda model: groups thatfeed off of chaos seemingly incur no penalty for having created that chaos themselves.from the american invasion of afghanistan
to the worsening of the syrian civil war,modern jihadis simultaneously require the use of military force and thrive off its leastavoidable side-effects.†- “the new iraqi government of abadi claimsto have learned this lesson, attacking isis without mercy while advocating a measuredreintegration of iraq’s sunni population. in baghdad, calls for full representationfor sunni arabs are punctuated by sunni suicide bombs in shia neighborhoods. only the freshnessof the isis trauma has kept iraq’s majority population from responding with the familiarcrackdowns, and kneejerk brutality toward blameless populations. but the extremist gambitis beginning to make progress with opportunistic or reactionary shia clerics, and as the embattledisis force continues to funnel much-needed
explosives away from the front and into distantpeaceful neighbourhoods, the true power of their strategy is being put to the test.â€
0 Comment
Write markup in comments